Muqtada Al-Sadr vs. Hassan Nasrallah

As I explained before that last Al-Sadr’s state­ment is not about the “spe­cial forces” and con­trary to the media focus on this issue, Muq­tada Al-Sadr’s media and infor­ma­tion advi­sor Al-Marwani wrote an arti­cle con­firms what I said.

Sadrists do not attribute infal­li­bil­ity [‘isma an attribute par­tic­u­lar to the prophet and Imams only] to their leader [Muq­tada Al-Sadr], but they used to feel his media, pol­i­tics, leg­is­la­tion role, and his con­trol to calm or to esca­late the sit­u­a­tion at the appro­pri­ate time and place.

Recent state­ment issued by Mr. Muq­tada al-Sadr, to con­tain the resistance’s arms at the hands of a selec­tive team(s), from inside the Imam Mahdi Army — is in real­ity an impor­tant step on the road to focus on the resis­tance, and a smart move to take out for­eign agen­das from the hon­or­able Iraqi national resistance.

Although most of the arti­cle cel­e­brates Moqtada’s intel­li­gence and wise-judgment, Iraqi intel­lec­tual and scholar in Shi­ites affairs Al-Ruba’i says that it wasn’t Muqtada’s deci­sion to deac­ti­vate the Mahdi Army.
Con­sid­er­ing the tim­ing, this deci­sion came with the Iraq — U.S. secu­rity agree­ment argu­ment, the writer argues that the Iran­ian mes­sage to Maliki is that his silence and not com­ment­ing on Al-Sadr’s state­ment can gives him a space to maneu­ver under “Iraqi public-opinion” cover to reject the agreement.

The inter­est­ing thing about Al-Ruba’I arti­cle is in the last para­graph where he said that both ways, Al-Sadr is step­ping ahead to power once again. In his last move, Maliki’s gov­ern­ment under­stood that there is no other option only re-cooperates with Muq­tada Al-Sadr.

Com­par­ing Has­san Nasrallah’s strat­egy, tac­tics and poli­cies to these of Muq­tada Al-Sadr’s, Al-Sadr falls far away behind.

In an arti­cle called “Nasrallah’s vic­tory in Lebanon and Al-Sadr’s defeat in Iraq”, the writer argues that although Muq­tada scores more in the “advan­tages” such as the num­ber of his sup­port­ers is dou­ble the res­i­dents of whole Lebanon, his coun­try [Iraq] is occu­pied while Lebanon is not occu­pied, his fam­ily back­ground, com­pared to Nasrallah’s, Al-Sadr failed and mis­used these priv­i­leges to advance his resis­tance project.

Has­san Nas­ral­lah par­tic­i­pated in the elec­tions and in a free and inde­pen­dent Lebanon. When he entered the provin­cial and par­lia­men­tary elec­tions, most of southern-Lebanon was under his con­trol, or allied with Amal Movement.

Has­san Nas­ral­lah did not allow any revelry-parties to run beside his party in his strong­holds in the south.

Muq­tada Al-Sadr ignored the secu­rity basic of his party when he allowed other par­ties — Al-Hakim Party in par­tic­u­lar — his arch­en­emy — to dom­i­nate the provin­cial coun­cils. An incom­pre­hen­si­ble move by the Sadr Trend, some peo­ple inter­preted it as (not to deal with the occu­pa­tion), but his par­lia­ment mem­bers and Sadrists min­is­ters in the Green Zone are deal­ing with the occupation.

Has­san Nas­ral­lah kept good rela­tion­ships with all Lebanese par­ties and polit­i­cal blocs, accord­ing to Lebanese national inter­ests and the inter­ests. and this rela­tion­ship built by Mr. Despite the seri­ous­ness of these rela­tions, Nas­ral­lah stayed cau­tion, par­tic­u­larly with those who are sup­ported by the Imperialist-powers and Saudi Arabia.

Muq­tada al-Sadr — with the great dif­fer­ence between the two cases, Lebanon is not occu­pied– kept semi-normal rela­tions with the occupation-collaborators par­ties and polit­i­cal blocs in the Green Zone. Al-Sadr received Ahmed Cha­l­abi and Ibrahim al-Jaafari and other rep­re­sen­ta­tives of par­ties in the Green Zone.