This is a good “heli­copter –view” of the Iraqi polit­i­cal scene regard­ing SOFA:

- The Kur­dish nation­al­ist par­ties pub­licly announced their total sup­port to SOFA, and attacked SOFA’s oppo­si­tion polit­i­cal blocs. The Kur­dish Islamic par­ties, stayed silent.

- Par­ties allied under the United Iraqi Alliance exchanged dif­fer­ent roles. The lead­ers of the Supreme Coun­cil shared var­i­ous posi­tions from the secu­rity agree­ment. Between non-acceptance, accep­tance and ask­ing to add new amend­ments to the pact, they finally set­tled on refus­ing seven — five arti­cles in the final draft. Second-degree politi­cians from this coali­tion are still announc­ing dif­fer­ent positions.

- Maliki’s Dawa Party, in each occa­sion keeps repeat­ing that the party sup­ports the gov­ern­ment decision.

- Sunni “Accor­dance Front” are also in dif­fer­ent posi­tions, some of them endorsed SOFA, some with reser­va­tion, and the other called for more time.

The offi­cial posi­tion of the Front has changed, from a neu­tral posi­tion and very close to sup­port the pact at the begin­ning, to the reser­va­tion and demand amendments.

- SOFA’s oppo­si­tion fronts are not at their best also, the ironic scene of the anti-occupation camp gives us an ini­tial idea of the real­ity of this camp:

Baath Party released a list of names called “trai­tors and agents of the occu­pa­tion” includes the name of Muq­tada Al-Sadr and the lead­ers of the Sadr Trend, some of them are still in the Amer­i­can pris­ons, while the Sadrists in every occa­sion curse the Baathists repeatedly.

This is just a tragic exam­ple refers to the total­i­tar­ian men­tal­ity that pro­duced such atti­tudes and delayed the final defeat of the occupation.

16 Comments

  1. I can’t under­stand your deep love for the iran’s pup­pet Moq­tada al-Sadr and his won­der­ful drill-team: how­ever it isn’t my busi­ness. But do you really think that the baath party should praise the Mahdi army, that not only eth­nic cleansed Bagh­dad and the south of iraq, mass mur­dered tens of thou­sands (con­ser­v­a­tive esti­mate) of inno­cent iraqis, fought against the resis­tance, forced hun­dreds of thou­sands of iraqis to fleee their coun­try and tor­tured and slaugh­tered the pales­tin­ian refugees in Iraq, but also lynched pres­i­dent Sad­dam Hus­sein, desacrated his body and danced around his desacrated body? And that the baath party doesn’t love that much Sadr’s death squads because of baathist “total­i­tar­ian men­tal­ity? What should the baath party party write accord­ing to you : “three cheers for the assas­sins of Sad­dam Hussein? ”

  2. Paola

    My deep love is to see the Sun­nis resis­tance forces work­ing together with Sadr against the occupation.

    Since this is not hap­pen­ing. I am with every group demand the with­drawal of the U.S. occu­pa­tion forces, it is the Sadrists “Mahdi Army, Harith Al-Dhari or the Baathists.

  3. Lady bird,

    i still can’t believe my lying eyes when i read you web­site. You have been denounc­ing the Mahdi army’s mon­struos crimes for years, you wrote many times that there was a coop­er­a­tion between Mahdi Army and US forces in order to eth­nic cleanse Iraq (for instance: http://www.roadstoiraq.com/2006/12/23/evidence-of-cooperation-between-mahdi-army-and-uus-forces-to-attack-sunni-neighborhoods/ ), then sud­dendly you started writ­ing eulo­gies to the sadrists mass mur­der­ers. But this isn’t my point. Of course you have the full right to change your mind and to like the sadrist drillers and maybe their Iran­ian mas­ters too.
    Am ask­ing another thing: how can you think that the vic­tims of the mahdy army could so eas­ily for­get and for­give their per­se­cu­tors, how can you think that the baath party could cheere the assas­sins of Sad­dam Hus­sein and of thou­sands of baathists? And above all, how can you believe that the iraqi resis­tance and the iraqi peo­ple could trust Sadr and his thugs that always fougth AGAINST the same resis­tance and that act at iran’s beck and call?

  4. Paola
    I never changed my mind, but there is dif­fer­ence between what I wish see and what is going on in reality.

    I just want to remind you that about one year and half, AL-Sadr had good rela­tions with the Sunni resis­tance and out the sud­den (After Al-Askreen mosque bomb­ing) not any more.

    There is a miss­ing link here, which prob­a­bly can be found in Iran or the U.S.

    Again, I am not say­ing that all the crimes must be for­got­ten, but first let us think how to kick the Amer­i­cans out and as for who com­mit­ted crimes that will come later.

  5. The Sadr move­ment is full of con­tra­dic­tions. The lead­er­ship became part of the occu­pa­tion polit­i­cal process in 2005, before the Golden Mosque was bombed. The best source on the mys­ter­ies around that bomb­ing is of course, you, Lady­bird.
    Even while the lead­ers have been on pay­roll we know con­clu­sively that the occu­pa­tion went after the JAM mil­i­tar­ily. There is evi­dence that the mass base not only returned the favor but some­times went on the offen­sive. It looks to me like the lead­ers like the occupation’s gravy but the Sadrist masses do what they will any­way. Maybe some of them are really Baathists?
    The Baath on the other hand has fought the occu­pa­tion tooth and nail from the start. It has main­tained the essen­tial prin­ci­ple of hav­ing no polit­i­cal deal­ings with the occu­pa­tion.
    So, the Sadrist lead­ers hate the Baath and the Baath hates the Sadrist lead­er­ship. That does not make them the same but there is, despite all the fail­ings of the Sadrists, a prob­lem of national unity.
    I don’t know the answer. My opin­ion is that it is a ques­tion of what the Baath and other sec­tions of the national resis­tance must do to over­come the prob­lems cre­ated by the Sadrist leaders.

  6. David, who sold them­selves out to Amer­i­cans again back in the late 50’s and early 60’s to get some U.S sup­port just to take a down a “nation­al­ist” and his group? Couldn’t have been Baathists could it?

    Or what about some guys in Anbar today, aka Baathists who not that long ago said they pre­fer John McCain (a guy who wants U.S troops to stay in Iraq as long as he feels like) as U.S pres­i­dent but that (if I recall cor­rect) they pre­ferred an U.S pres­ence in the country?

    Like lady­bird said, kick out amer­i­cans and every other for­eigner (includ­ing ones from neighb­hour­ing coun­tries) and then solve out prob­lems about who com­mited most crimes. The Baathists have no moral high­grounds what­so­ever, every group is respon­si­ble for crimes.

  7. It would help, Lagash, if you would relate a few facts rather than vague ref­er­ences to who-knows-what leg­ends, imag­in­ings, etc.

  8. You mean that the CIA didn’t pro­vide lists of ICP lead­ers (and mem­bers) to the Baathists, who later on would carry out house-to-house hunt and kill most of them with the excep­tion of those who man­aged to flee? What? Iraqi com­mu­nists com­mu­ni­ties just set­tled down into places like Swe­den, UK, Nor­way just like that, for no rea­son? I’m sure they just pre­ferred to leave their coun­try, no one ever per­se­cuted them eh? They all just packed and left! That makes absolutely sense doesn’t it?

    The Baathist party had full sup­port from the U.S gov­ern­ment, not due to the fact that the U.S gov­ern­ment were in love with Baathists but due to the fact that Qasim and his group tried to nation­alise the Iraqi oil indus­try and cre­ated what the U.S con­sid­ered as pro­vok­ing eco­nomic poli­cies. To put it sim­ply, the U.S wanted to get rid of Qasim due to his “love” for his coun­try thus the Baathists, who also were ene­mies of Qasim, served as the per­fect tools for get­ting rid of him. The enemy of my enemy is my friend!

    While you’re in your state of denial do the world a favor and jump off from a cliff.

  9. Lagash, on your nick: do you read Sumer­ian too? A lot of schol­ars here in Fin­land do that.

    It’s very bad the occu­pa­tion mobs and their min­ions are destroy­ing and/or loot­ing the cuneiform tablets and all the stuff there.

    NDHF Net
    http://newsdeskhelsinkifinland.net

  10. I’ve stud­ied about the Sumer­ian civ­i­liza­tion, although not to the degree that I con­sider myself good at the sub­ject. Despite hav­ing had inter­est for years about it I’ve sim­ply not had the time to sit down and read care­fully about this beau­ti­ful civ­i­liza­tion. I hope to study more about it soon though.

    Indeed it is sad that thugs are destroy­ing the remains of one of the first civ­i­liza­tions in the world, the failed Iraqi gov­ern­ment should put more work into pro­tect­ing those impor­tant sites. It will never hap­pen though con­sid­er­ing the fact that they never cared about U.S base(s) destroy­ing remains of Baby­lo­nia until peo­ple actu­ally started to notice it.

  11. I’ve learned some Sumer­ian via Hit­tite lan­guage, in which the Sumer­ian ideograms are often used hap­pily mixed with Hit­tite words (Sumer­ian indi­cated with CAPITALS between the Hit­tite), often fur­ther sup­ported by Akka­dian (!!) prepositions.

    All are cuneiform or syl­labic scripts, so that in addi­tion to the ideograms, pic­tures for entire words (e.g. LUGAL “king”), they are given in syl­labic script, with a vowel sup­port­ing (a) consonat(s), like “mu”, “ug”, and so on (the syl­labes sep­a­rated with “-” from each other).

    Thus, for exam­ple, a Hit­tite text with some Sumer­ian could begin as follows:

    nu-mu DUMU LUGAL.GAL (.…)

    which would mean

    now-(to/for) me SON (of) KING.GREAT (…)”

    or more freely

    Now, for/to me, the son of the great king (…)”

    By read­ing the Hit­tite text, you come also a lit­tle famil­iar with the most com­mon words, such as DUMU “son”, ID “river”, HURSAG “moun­tain”, includ­ing names, in this case LAGASH which I read­ily rec­og­nized as a Sumer­ian place name.

    Some­times you can also under­stand the con­tents of some Sumer­ian words as, say, in the exam­ple above, the LUGAL word seems to con­tain two other Sumer­ian words, namelu LU “man” and GAL “great, mighty, etc.” (also added to the LUGAL.GAL), “king” being more accu­rately “man of might”.

    I hope we get this war over soon so that I can con­cen­trate more on Sumer­ian rather than those wip­ing off the Sumer­ian cul­ture off the earth…

    Let’s see what we can deliver for that

    Jouna Pyysalo
    NDHF Net
    http://newsdeskhelsinkifinland.net

  12. Lagash–

    Maybe the CIA pro­vided lists, maybe it didn’t. So what? Iraqis know infi­nitely more about Iraq than the CIA. They always have.
    The 1963 mas­sacre of the com­mu­nists was a bad thing but you treat it as a CIA plot in which the Baath was only a tool. You are wrong. It was an inter­nal con­flict of Iraqi soci­ety. Your analy­sis is national-chauvinist. Non-Baathist mil­i­tary offi­cers ended up in power in 1963, by the way.
    In 1972 the Baath car­ried through what Kassem could only begin — the actual nation­al­iza­tion of Iraq’s oil. That’s another thing you fail to men­tion. The way you argue is frag­men­tary and dis­tortive. It only serves as a ‘left’ cover to make the Baathists as bad, or worse, than the impe­ri­al­ist aggres­sors.
    Your recourse to per­sonal insult shows only that you well know how false your ‘analy­sis’ really is.

  13. David, you’ve missed my whole point entirely. I never said the coup d’état of Qasim was merely a CIA plot. My orig­i­nal point was to prove that the Iraqi Baathists sold them selves out once to their ene­mies (aka co-op with the U.S gov­ern­ment to get sup­port). You seem to have missed this point ENTIRELY. Those vague “ref­er­ences” as you called them can all be found on the net, I sug­gest the search tool google in case if you haven’t heard about it by now.

    The fact that the Baathists had prob­lems with Qasim and his group has noth­ing to do at all with U.S sup­port for the Baathists, you’ve mixed those two points, fur­ther­more I never cared and wrote about inter­nal conflicts.

    Indeed there were non-Baathists lead­ers in power after the over­throw of the pre­vi­ous gov­ern­ment, so what? By 1974 any­one within the Baath party who had rela­tions with other polit­i­cal par­ties would be exe­cuted accord­ing to RCCR No .865 (funny btw how many of these res­o­lu­tions con­tra­dict with what the Baathists them­selves DID to come to power)

    Great, I never said Baathists never made any­thing good for the coun­try, like all polit­i­cal par­ties they did both bad and good, nation­al­iza­tion of Iraq’s oil was good, too bad that the coun­try didn’t ben­e­fit of it in the end as they took most of the money to themselves.

    The U.S is still the biggest enemy to Iraq in my eyes. Between the U.S and the Iraqi Baathists the Iraqi Baathists are angels. Still doensn’t stop me from view­ing the Baathists gov­ern­ment as trash, not that the cur­rent one we have now is any bet­ter. The Baathists were a tool to U.S plans, they were back­stabbed which they real­ized after what would have been a suc­ces­ful occu­pa­tion of Kuwait turned into a fail­ure (in fact they already got back­stabbed ear­lier through U.S sup­port for Iran dur­ing the Iran-Iraq war). The Baathists had their own inter­est, it doesn’t stop the fact that the U.S ben­e­fit­ted from Iraqis over­throw­ing Qasim’s gov­ern­ment, Iraq hav­ing war with Iran, the Baath party crush­ing any resis­tance against them, and finally Iraq try­ing to occu­pate Kuwait (which was a good thing to try and do as Kuwait belongs to Iraq). How­ever, this and fur­ther U.S inter­est is irrel­e­vant in this discussion.

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The political map regarding SOFA

This article was written October 31st, 2008, with the mathematical number of 16 contributions.