Election crisis, the U.S. sending out two con­tra­dic­tory signals

The plan is very sim­ple; make as much noise as pos­si­ble and the Amer­i­cans will accept the “J and A” deci­sions (and will rec­og­nize the elec­tion results).

At least it worked with Tal­a­bani, who tries to syn­chro­nize his posi­tion with the Kur­dish Alliance say­ing today:

The Baathists appeared again, their return to the polit­i­cal process in Iraq is a major threat, their cur­rent move­ment designed to win the sym­pa­thy of Arab pub­lic opin­ion to start a mil­i­tary coup in Iraq.

Some kind of “cold-war” between Sec­tar­ian par­ties and the U.S. ambas­sador in Iraq “Christo­pher Hill”. Hill told the media that the U.S. will con­tinue to with­draw its troops from Iraq grad­u­ally accord­ing to the agree­ment, but its role will in Iraq will con­tinue accord­ing to the Agree­ments signed between the two countries.

Orches­trat­ing demon­stra­tions in Bagh­dad and Basra, UIA threat­ened to boy­cott the elec­tion, threats to post­pone the elec­tion, and Sami Al-Askari — Maliki’s “State of Law” MP — threat­ened to fire all the mem­bers of the Appeal Court if they do not resign. These actions also worked forc­ing the Appeal Court to review the names of the excluded politi­cians before the election.

The U.S. send­ing out two con­tra­dic­tory signals

Wash­ing­ton expresses its opin­ion to the Iraqis on what is hap­pen­ing recently in Bagh­dad, man­ag­ing to resolve the cur­rent cri­sis, giv­ing two con­tra­dic­tory signals.

The first method char­ac­ter­ized by cour­tesy and decency when Biden vis­its Bagh­dad for dia­logue with Iraqi lead­ers, tries to gen­er­al­ize the U.S. posi­tion of the rejec­tion atti­tude of the exclu­sion of the some politi­cians and the will­ing to inte­grate the Baathists and other oppo­nents in the polit­i­cal process if accepted.

While the Iraqi gov­ern­ment and in par­tic­u­lar Maliki stands against this inte­grate even if the Baathists accept the polit­i­cal process. Biden in his last visit to Bagh­dad avoided the clash with Maliki, who is sup­ported by the other Shi­ite fac­tions despite the many dif­fer­ences with him.

A mes­sage Al-Hashemi wanted it to be heard in Bagh­dad, but he didn’t want to say it him­self. The next day U.S. ambas­sador in Iraq Christo­pher Hill repeated the above say­ing that “J and A” process is mismanaged.