As often, the Sadrists did not hes­i­tate to express their rejec­tion to the U.S. Vice Pres­i­dent Joe Biden’s visit to Bagh­dad with their own style, by putting their mark on this visit with three Katyusha rock­ets exploded around the U.S. embassy in the Green Zone.

At the same time, the Supreme Coun­cil led by Ammar Al-Hakim did not issue an offi­cial posi­tion on the sce­nario for the for­ma­tion of the gov­ern­ment, but the con­dem­na­tion expressed by the Sadrists, either through a state­ment released by Muq­tada Al-Sadr, in which he called, Maliki and Allawi not to bow to the U.S. Pres­sure, or a state­ments made by the leader of the Supreme Coun­cil Sadr al-Din Qabanji — close to Iran, which he noted that Biden’s visit aims to pres­sure the Iraqi lead­ers to imple­ment the Amer­i­can agenda.

Need to notice, that the U.S. Con­gress del­e­ga­tion headed by Sen­a­tor John McCain, excluded Ammar Al-Hakim from their meet­ings with the Iraqi lead­ers, despite that the U.S. met the rest of the Iraqi polit­i­cal fig­ures. A delib­er­ate exclu­sion which might have paved the way for Vice-President Biden to intro­duce his power-sharing plan, which exclude all those who are con­nected to Iran from the “active” government.

Accord­ing to Maliki’s spokesman Ali Al-Dabagh, Biden pre­sented three sug­ges­tions to Maliki which (in Biden’s opin­ion) can for­mu­late the shape of the com­ing gov­er­ment in Iraq. Fur­ther, Dabagh gave no details on these three suggestions.

1st sce­nario:

Favored by Wash­ing­ton, an alliance between the “State of Law” and Al-Iraqiya to form a par­lia­men­tary major­ity gov­ern­ment, leav­ing the rest of the blocs in the par­lia­men­tary oppo­si­tion seats. This sce­nario is put clearly in the let­ter of 34 mem­bers of the U.S. Con­gress to Maliki, and crit­i­cized by Pres­i­dent Jalal Tal­a­bani dur­ing his meet­ing with the U.S. Con­gress del­e­ga­tion headed by Sen­a­tor John McCain dur­ing their meet­ing in his office last Friday.

2nd sce­nario:

Empha­sized by Biden in pre­vi­ous visit, accord­ing to sources, who wish to form a gov­ern­ment, and has pre­vi­ously put on the Iraqi fac­tions dur­ing his pre­vi­ous visit to Baghdad.

The coali­tion of the will­ing, is the re-formation of the par­lia­men­tary map between those who wish to form a major­ity gov­ern­ment and those who pre­fer to stay in the oppo­si­tion. This sce­nario is rejected by the Kurds and the Supreme Coun­cil, stress­ing on the impor­tance of form­ing a national unity government.

3rd sce­nario:

The shift towards the con­cept of strate­gic part­ner­ship requires a technocrats-government, can be formed from the var­i­ous polit­i­cal blocs dis­trib­uted on the gov­er­men­tal sov­er­eign posts, which may be closer to the quo­tas “Muhasasa” for­ma­tion of the pre­vi­ous gov­ern­ment led by Maliki. Maliki, Allawi agreed with this sce­nario, while rejected by the Kurds and the Iraqi National Alliance.

The com­mon line between all these sce­nar­ios is to avoid the for­ma­tion of a gov­ern­ment based on quo­tas where the secu­rity forces are con­troled by par­ties loyal to Iran, par­tic­u­larly those mili­tias formed in Iran, ref­fer­ing to Badr Orga­ni­za­tion, the armed wing of the Supreme Islamic Coun­cil, or the Iranian-backed mili­tias such as Asaib Al-Haq, and Hezbol­lah Brigades, which are described as a ter­ror­ist groups by the U.S. military.