Too early to judge Biden’s visit and the U.S. Sug­ges­tions regard­ing the for­ma­tion of the Iraqi gov­ern­ment as fail­ure or suc­cess, but the only thing the Amer­i­cans need to under­stand, is that his­tory in Iraq does not sig­nif­i­cantly change its tac­tics and behav­ior. There­fore, an end to the polit­i­cal vac­uum cri­sis should be an Amer­i­can res­o­lu­tion forces all polit­i­cal sides to form a government.

Data from the per­for­mance of the Iraqi polit­i­cal behav­ior shows, the buy and sale deals occurred dur­ing Biden’s visit:

The Prime Min­is­ter Maliki, a Shi­ite polit­i­cal leader .. But, a few months before the expiry of his man­date, he sold every­one includ­ing his Shiite-allies in Washington’s favor .. In exchange for the U.S. sup­port to con­tinue his sec­ond man­date as the prime min­is­ter of Iraq.

The for­mer Iraqi Prime Min­is­ter Allawi, also a Shi­ites .. but a few months before the elec­tion, he sold every­body includ­ing his allies to Iraqi Sun­nis and sec­u­lars, allow­ing him to get the sup­port of Saudi Arabia.

When Maliki sought an alliance with the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), .. .. not the U.S., nei­ther Saudi Ara­bia inter­vened in the mat­ter … But when Maliki turned his back on the “Iraqi National Alliance”, and wanted to nego­ti­ate with Iyad Allawi, U.S. vice-President Joseph Biden was quick to visit to Iraq to show the U.S. bless­ing to the process of buy­ing and selling.

In this regard, we note the exis­tence of deals .. The first is the pub­licly announced deal between Maliki, Allawi .. The sec­ond is the unan­nounced deal in Wash­ing­ton, between the neo-conservatives, who oppose the U.S. with­drawal from Iraq, and the hard-line stream within the U.S. Demo­c­ra­tic Party .. Demand the divi­sion of Iraq, then the U.S. with­drawal later, a stream led by vice-president Biden.

If no new gov­ern­ment is formed within the time pre­scribed con­sti­tu­tion­ally .. , then the sit­u­a­tion will evolve to a new par­lia­men­tary elec­tions round. A new elec­tion, which will not be held soon, and will pro­vide oppor­tu­ni­ties for the Wash­ing­ton hawks in terms of find­ing the jus­ti­fi­ca­tions and excuses to post­pone the with­drawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.

There­fore Iraq will have to wait more and more .. Which is expected to be the oppor­tu­nity for the U.S. Repub­li­cans to climb back to the White House, and then it is dif­fi­cult to talk about with­draw­ing U.S. troops from Iraq.

To counter Biden’s plan and the U.S. Agenda, Al-Hakim announced his refusal to Maliki’s sec­ond term, with an open (and pub­licly pub­lished) let­ter, in an attempt to to mobi­lize the Shi­ite street, and the Shi­ite reli­gious author­i­ties to con­demn Maliki’s posi­tion as the per­son who will hand over power to the Baathists and loy­al­ists of the regional agenda and Amer­i­cans, which might lead to the fall of Maliki polit­i­cally, and forced one of Maliki’s Dawa Party lead­ers to announce: “Maliki is the Shi­ites and the Shi­ites are Maliki”.

The Hawza (Shi­ites supreme ref­er­ences), under­stood Al-Hakim’s remarks and and Biden’s hid­den agenda, reacted with a new threat to inter­vene (fol­lowed later with a direct threat from Sis­tani him­self, ask­ing the Shi­ites to form a a millions-demonstration walk to Sam­mara [Sunni-city], as a ges­ture, in which Sis­tani wants to express his refusal of the return of “Baathists” Allawi to the government).

The same posi­tion also announced by Iran, express­ing their wor­ries about the renewed talks between Maliki and Allawi, espe­cially after Maliki insulted both Iran and the Iraqi supreme Hawza with visit to Lebanon, kneel­ing before Aya­tol­lah Fadlallah’s grave.

One thing you need to notice in all this mess, is the decline of the Sadrists role. At a time when the posi­tion of the Sadrists was strong and push­ing in last period towards the rejec­tion of Maliki’s sec­ond term, the upreme Coun­cil led by Ammar al-Hakim is the one who picked the lead but not only by reject­ing Maliki, but mov­ing towards a com­pro­mise can­di­date accept­able to all par­ties (who is their own can­di­date, Adel Abd Al-Mehdi).

The posi­tions that has begun to encounter the polit­i­cal body of the Sadrist move­ment seem larger than its abil­ity to accom­mo­date dif­fer­ent polit­i­cal con­tra­dic­tions in the Iraqi scene. There­fore, it seemed there was some kind of con­tra­dic­tion and no clar­ity in its deci­sions. Muqatada Al-Sadr him­self felt the need of per­sonal inter­ven­tion to set­tle the dif­fer­ences among the dif­fer­ent bod­ies of his movements.