With less than 24 hours since INA released an official statement announced the freeze of all negotiations with the “State of Law” coalition (interesting is that the announcement is read by Ahmed Al-Chalabi, to deny the speculations that Chalabi stand against the freeze decision), Maliki managed to return the ping-pong ball to INA’s side, asking the official Iraqi satellite TV to orchestrate an interview with the Prime Minister.
In the interview Maliki tried to embarrass INA Coalition, asking (challenge) its leaders to announce their own candidate for the Prime Minister post, in an attempt from Maliki to start an internal conflict between Sadr and Hakim.
The interview, and Maliki’s insistence to nominate himself as the only candidate, add to this what Al-Sumeria revealed that the U.S. wants to see Maliki and Allawi in one government (which means the exclusion of INA), INA members started to use a new threat language, hinted to activate Article 64 of the Constitution to dissolve the parliament and hold new elections.
Parallel to the above, the United Nations representative “Ad Melkert” had telephone contact with the Muqtada Al-Sadr to discuss the crisis and the latter stressed on his three no’s (no to Maliki, no to Iyad Allawi, and no to Adil Abdul-Mahdi).
INA’s threat of holding a new election is a wake up call to Supreme Clerics in the Hawza to intervene, and the call is already materialized in a suggestion made by Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir Najafi (second in rank after Sistani), invited the leaders of the four coalitions (State of Law, the Iraqi National Alliance, Al-Iraqiya the Kurdistan Alliance) to go to his office for talks in order to reach a solution.
Despite that Ayatollah Najafi is one of the four hi-rank references in the Hawza, in the terms of authority, he is not equivalent to the supreme Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani and, therefore, I expect that this step has been agreed upon by all the Hawza’s supreme authorities as a first step on the road to intervention if things stay at the square one.
by Scott Sullivan
A Sadr Victory Plan for Iraq
Here is a national victory plan for Iraqi patriots. The plan assumes that Iranian subversion via the Kurds is Iraq’s greatest enemy. The US occupation is a secondary problem. In fact, the US is a potential Iraqi ally against Iran.
First, Muqtada al Sadr should postpone the Kirkuk referendum. A decision to move ahead with the referendum would be a mistake. The Kurds would immediately annex Kirkuk and its oil wealth and declare independence. Meanwhile, Iran would annex Basra and its oil wealth. Iraq would be partitioned between Iran and the Kurds. Iraq would disappear from the map. Most Iraqis oppose this outcome, as do all of Iraq’s neighbors, aside from Iran
Second, Sadr should encourage Turkey to approach the US about deploying Turkish peacekeepers to Kirkuk and Basra. This is the most effective way to prevent Iraq’s partition by Iran and the Kurds. Turkey will be receptive because it knows that Iraq’s partition would destabilize Iraq and the region. Moreover, Turkey is being pressed to do more about Iraq by Syria, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.
Third, Sadr should present Talabani and Barzani with an ultimatum on the Iraqi flag. The Kurds refuse to honor the Iraqi flag. Maliki will tell Talabani and Barzani will that they have twenty-four hours to hoist the Iraqi flag throughout the Kurdish districts. If they fail to comply, Iraqi and US forces will move in and raise the Iraqi flag.
Fourth, Sadr should investigate why Talabani and Barzani have been holding meetings with the top ranking officials of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Quds Force, which are Iran’s Special Operation Forces. Have Prime Minister Maliki and US force commanders approved of these secret Kurdish-Iranian meetings? What topics are on the agenda? Are Talabani and Barzani using these meetings to prepare for the Kurdish-Iranian partition of Iraq? If so, should Talabani be impeached?
Fifth, Sadr and US force commanders should consider requesting Iran to withdraw the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Quds force from Iraq. If Iran refuses, then Iraq should immediately request Turkish peacekeepers for Basra and Kirkuk.
Sixth, if Iran refuses to withdraw its paramilitary forces from Iraq, SAdr should announce that Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would not be welcome in Baghdad, and would be denied a visa for any possible visit.
Seventh, Sadr should query Malaki for an explanation of why he abandoned the Pertaeus-Maliki-Sadr political accords for Iraqi reconciliation an an end to Maliki’s extra-constitutional war against Sadr, a war that boosted Iraq’s adversaries such as Iran and the Kurds, Why does Maliki consider Muqtada al Sadr, who wants a unified Iraqi state, to be his enemy. At the same time, Maliki looked upon Ahmadinejad and his Revolutionary Guards, who are doing what they can to partition Iraq, to be valued partners.
An earlier version of this op-ed first appeared in theconservativevoice,com, April 11, 2007
——————————————————————————–