How will Muqtada Al-Sadr save Hezbollah and Syria from Hariri’s indictment?

Man­aged to main­tain its strength among the masses, Al-Sadr employed this force to achieve polit­i­cal gains ahead of all the other Islamic forces, hold­ing forty par­lia­men­tary seats, seven min­istries, and the par­lia­ment Deputy-presidency, which made the leader of the Move­ment a major polit­i­cal player with the abil­ity to influ­ence the over­all polit­i­cal process.This polit­i­cal weight would give Muq­tada Al-Sadr a semi-immunity against emer­gency circumstances.

The real strate­gic secret behind Muq­tada Al-Sadr’s return to Iraq is pre­cisely cal­cu­lated. We already know that Al-Sadr has a strong rela­tion with the Syr­ian lead­er­ship, as well as a spe­cial “fam­ily, orga­ni­za­tional and logis­ti­cal” ties with Has­san Nas­ral­lah and Hezbol­lah, not to men­tion his rela­tion with Iran, which is for Iraqi Shi­ite politi­cians is the high­est Shi­ite polit­i­cal ref­er­ence, and a strate­gic ally.

The Inter­na­tional tribunal’s deci­sion or indict­ment against for the assas­si­na­tion of “Hariri” is very close [Mon­day accord­ing to the French Le Mond], espe­cially after the fail­ure of the ini­tia­tive “Syria and Saudi Ara­bia” with pres­sure from the U.S. and France.

We already know that the indict­ment will accuses mem­bers of the Lebanese Hezbol­lah and per­haps some Syr­ian offi­cials. This will put the “Lebanese-Syrian-Iranian” front in a regional dec­la­ra­tion of war.

Since Iraq has become linked geopo­lit­i­cal and logis­ti­cally to Lebanon and vice versa. Iraq will be affected by any devel­op­ment in Lebanon, and this forced Al-Sadr to return to Iraq as quick as pos­si­ble, to not to leave Lebanon, Hezbol­lah, Syria and Iran with­out insur­ance, pro­tec­tion from the weak Iraqi link. At the same Hezbol­lah, Syria and Iran will back the Sadrist Move­ment within the same strategy.

Here is Iraq’s FM Zebari say­ing:

Iraq was fol­low­ing up devel­op­ments of the tri­bunal … We are also a party in this equa­tion. We are not absent from US-Iranian rela­tions, [Iran’s] nuclear issue, the sit­u­a­tion in Lebanon, the tribunal’s deci­sion or indict­ment and from rela­tions with Syria.

At this point, Al-Sadr will raise the readi­ness of the Sadrist Move­ment and all its mil­i­tary wings to open a front against the U.S. to ease the ten­sion on Hezbol­lah and Syria, if both sense the dan­ger of U.S.-Israel mil­i­tary activities.

This is what the Syria news­pa­per Al-Watan wrote two days ago:

Wash­ing­ton mil­i­tary bases in Iraq and Afghanistan … Will col­lide against the Arab and Islamic forces who do not accept and resist the Amer­i­can mil­i­tary intervention.

The return of Muq­tada al-Sadr is a mes­sage to the Amer­i­cans in the first place to reshuf­fle its agenda, The U.S. tried to iden­tify the approach adopted by al-Sadr after his return in deal­ing with the over­all polit­i­cal and secu­rity sit­u­a­tion in Iraq, cir­cu­lat­ing the the leader of the move­ment is less rad­i­cal than before, despite his focus on “resist­ing the occu­pa­tion” in his recent speech “peace­fully”.

Timed after Biden’s visit and his talks with Sis­tani (lasted about 3 hours in pri­vate), Al-Sadr adopted the “Liwa’a Al-Youm Al-Maoud” “The Promised Day” mili­tia today and promised to con­tinue the fight against the Amer­i­cans, saying:

“Liwa’a Al-Youm Al-Maoud” belongs to us and is not affil­i­ated to any one else. They are obe­di­ent and ask God to grant them victory.

Wash­ing­ton con­sid­ers “the Promised Day”, “Hezbol­lah in Iraq”, “Revenge of God” and the “League of the Right­eous” are mili­tias linked and funded by Iran.

Because the Sadrists feel that they allowed Maliki to his sec­ond term, the pres­ence of its leader in the arena may influ­ence the per­for­mance of the gov­ern­ment and thus will force the prime min­is­ter to imple­ment the U.S. with­drawal with­out delay accord­ing to the secu­rity agree­ment signed between the two sides, and that will put the Prime Min­is­ter in a very dif­fi­cult posi­tion in the dra­matic devel­op­ments in Lebanon.